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Introduction
This case addresses for the first time the compatibility of section 75(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983 with
Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The decision of the Court of Appeal was
that the statutory duty of the Secretary of State to act quickly in referring a recalled patient’s case to the
Mental Health Review Tribunal, combined with the patient’s right to challenge the lawfulness of his
detention by way of judicial review, was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 5(4).
The Facts
Daniel Rayner was convicted in 2002 of assault and possession of an offensive weapon. He was diagnosed
as suffering from schizophrenia and made the subject of hospital and restriction orders under sections 37
and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983 [‘MHA’]. In 2004 a Mental Health Review Tribunal directed his
conditional discharge under section 73 MHA. In 2005 he was readmitted as a voluntary patient, and on
14 June 2005 the Secretary of State for the Home Department issued a warrant under section 42(3)
MHA formally recalling him to hospital.
In response to a letter from Mr Rayner’s solicitors, the Home Office wrote on 8 August 2005 that, due to
an oversight, a referral to the tribunal was not made following the recall to hospital in June. The referral
was made that same day.
The tribunal arranged for the hearing of the reference to take place on 27 September 2005, but that date
had to be vacated because of problems in providing the necessary reports in time. The hearing eventually
took place on 28 October 2005, when the tribunal directed the deferred conditional discharge of Mr
Rayner; because one of the conditions was only fulfilled on 12 January 2006, it was only on that date that
he was discharged.
The Law
Where a conditionally discharged patient has been recalled, section 75(1) MHA requires the Secretary
of State to refer his case to the tribunal within one month of the day on which he returns to hospital.
Once the reference has been made, rule 29(cc) of the Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules 1983
requires a hearing to be fixed in the period between five and eight weeks after the date of the reference.
In this case, therefore, the Secretary of State was required to refer Mr Rayner’s case to the tribunal before,
at the latest, 14 July 2005.
1 Barristers, Garden Court Chambers, London. The authors are grateful to Paul Bowen (Barrister) for providing the information
at notes 2 and 3.
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Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: “Everyone who is deprived of his
liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention
shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
In the Administrative Court, the case came before Holman J. He concluded that the legislative scheme
was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. He held however that Mr Rayner’s
case should have been the subject of an “immediate” referral by the Secretary of State and that the
Secretary of State’s delay in referring the case was unlawful. Both the Secretary of State and Mr Rayner
appealed. 
At the appeal stage, it was conceded on behalf of Mr Rayner that the timescale for a reference in section
75(1) is not incompatible with a patient’s rights under Article 5(4) of the Convention; it does not prevent
a prompt reference and a speedy decision by the tribunal, and the stipulation that the Secretary of State
must act within a maximum of one month does not prevent him from acting with such promptness within
that month as is required by Article 5(4). 
However, it was argued that the absence of any statutory means by which a patient can make his own
application to the tribunal after he has been recalled is incompatible with his Article 5(4) right to take
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided. Mr Rayner’s cross-appeal therefore
focused on the legislative requirement for dependence upon the Secretary of State to provide him with
access to a court.
The Secretary of State conceded that on the facts of this case, he was in breach of Article 5(4) and of the
duty under section 75(1), in that the reference was not made by him until 8 August 2005, which was
almost two months after Mr Rayner’s return to hospital with the status of a compulsory detainee. That
delay meant that a speedy determination of the lawfulness of his detention was not achieved. 
However, the Secretary of State challenged the way in which Holman J at first instance described the duty
of referral under section 75(1). The judge spoke in terms of Article 5(4) requiring an “immediate
reference” to the tribunal and stated that a case should be referred “at once” unless the circumstances of
the applicant or his case positively required otherwise. The judge noted the evidence given on behalf of
the Secretary of State that his normal practice was to refer within 72 hours of recall, in the light of which
he found that in this case “the very last day upon which the Secretary of State could lawfully have referred
the case was Monday 20 June”. 
The Decision
(i) The Secretary of State’s duty of referral
The period of one month within which the Secretary of State must refer a recalled patient’s case to the
tribunal (section 75(1)(a)) runs from the return of the patient to hospital, not the date of the recall. The
need to comply with the obligation to refer cannot have come as a surprise to the Secretary of State,
because it is he who issues the warrant of recall.
The requirement in Article 5(4) is that a court decision is obtained speedily, rather than that proceedings
are started speedily; that is, the obligation relates to the period within which the proceedings are
determined, and not the speed with which they are initiated. In theory, laxity at the referral stage could
be vitiated by alacrity by the tribunal upon receipt of the reference.
The Secretary of State is not generally entitled to take the statutory maximum of one month before
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making a reference: a more energetic approach is required where the liberty of the subject is at stake, and,
since a recalled patient has no direct right to apply to the tribunal himself, it is all the more important
that the Secretary of State should act with despatch. It was the Secretary of State’s practice to make a
reference as soon as possible and normally within 72 hours; there would normally be no reason for him
to take longer. Moreover, it is his duty to obtain without delay the necessary information as to the patient’s
return to hospital.
However, Holman J’s use of the word ‘immediate’ to describe the reference required by Article 5(4) was
incorrect: that interpretation of the word ‘speedily’ was not supported by the decisions of the Strasbourg
Court, which has dealt with Article 5(4) issues on a case-by-case basis. The domestic courts should adopt
the same approach, and should not prescribe quantified periods of time within which determination
should be achieved; many factors, including delays by the patient and his representatives, could affect the
timing of the hearing.
The test for the Secretary of State’s duty to refer under section 75(1) was whether there was a failure to
proceed with reasonable despatch, having regard to all the material circumstances. The test was as
appropriate to the section 75(1) duty (i.e. to make the referral) as it was in respect of the timescale for
determination. 
On the facts, Holman J’s conclusion that the reference should have been made by 20 June 2005, almost
a week after the issue of the warrant, was correct. It was in any event conceded by the Secretary of state
that he was in breach of Article 5(4) and section 75(1).
(ii) The right to take proceedings
Keene LJ identified a recent shift of emphasis in the Strasbourg jurisprudence, towards a greater emphasis
on the Article 5(4) requirement that a detained person should be able to take the initiative to start
proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of the detention. For example, in Rakevich v Russia [2004] MHLR
37, despite there being a duty on the detaining hospital to make an application to a court for approval of
the patient’s detention, Article 5(4) was violated because the patient did not herself have the direct right
to apply for her release (that is, to take proceedings as opposed to have them initiated on her behalf).
However, because in English domestic law there is a statutory mechanism requiring the state authorities
to act quickly in getting the issue of the lawfulness of a detention before the courts (which duty may be
enforced by the patient by way of judicial review), and because a detained patient, including a recalled
patient, has the right to use judicial review or habeas corpus to mount a direct challenge to the lawfulness
of his detention, Article 5(4) was not violated. Keene LJ added that the Administrative Court, on an
application for judicial review or habeas corpus by a detained patient, could order the Secretary of State
to discharge the patient on a conditional basis if it was appropriate.2
Comment
The Secretary of State’s position, that he could wait up to a month before making a reference, was
unlikely to be accepted by the court. In R (C ) v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2002] 1 WLR 176, a
successful challenge to an administrative practice whereby the Mental Health Review Tribunal would list
every case after eight weeks, Lord Phillips MR stated it was not lawful to make no effort to see that the
individual application is considered as soon as possible. It was therefore unsurprising that Keene LJ in
2 A petition to the House of Lords is intended to be made.
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Rayner at paragraph 21 observed that the Secretary of State could not generally be entitled to wait for a
month before making the referral and that the where the liberty of the subject is at stake, speediness
requires a more rapid and energetic approach. On the other hand, the Court of Appeal did not accept
the patient’s submission (accepted by Holman J in the court below) that an immediate referral was
required, and observed the distinction between “speedily” (in Article 5 (4)) and “promptly” (in Article 5
(3)), the latter importing a more exacting requirement of expedition. However, Holman J’s finding that a
referral should have been made within a week was upheld. 
This case is reminiscent of R (SC) v (1) MHRT (2) The Secretary of State For Health & Secretary of State
For The Home Department [2005] MHLR 31 - in both cases, flaws in the terms of section 75 MHA were
decided nevertheless to be compatible with detained patients’ Article 5 rights because the Administrative
Court is available as a form of panacea. However, whilst in SC the court’s role was as a subsequent
corrective to an unlawful tribunal decision, Rayner goes further.
Keene LJ concluded at paragraph 46 that section 75, if it stood alone, might not now be sufficient to
accord with the requirements of Article 5(4). But, taken with the Administrative Court’s post Human
Rights Act 1998 [‘HRA’] power to step into the role of an Article 6 court and reach substantive decisions
on the merits, it was saved. 
This is a procedure which the Administrative Court is likely to approach with considerable distaste.
Keene LJ relied heavily on R (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority [2002] 1 WLR 419 , in
which the Court of Appeal decided that Article 6 of the Convention required a patient’s judicial review
of a decision to treat him compulsorily under section 58 MHA to be a full merits hearing with, if
necessary, the cross-examination of witnesses. However, in R (N) v M [2003] 1 WLR 562, when the
Court of Appeal considered the same point, following the first substantive claim of this nature, it said at
paragraph 39: “although in some cases the nature of the challenge may be such that the court cannot
decide the ultimate question without determining for itself the disputed facts, it should not be overlooked
that the court’s role is essentially one of review” (emphasis added).
As a very strong indication of the continuing difficulty of this question, the judgment of Baroness Hale
of Richmond in R (H) v Secretary of State for Health [2005] 4 All E.R. 1311 is instructive: at paragraph
31 she describes the post HRA possibility that the Administrative Court will be obliged to conduct a
merits review of a patient’s detention where a patient is detained under section 2 MHA for longer than
is usually allowed, because there are parallel proceedings relating to their nearest relative. She said the
Court is not well equipped to conduct such a review, and may take some persuading that it is necessary:
“First, it is not used to hearing oral evidence and cross examination. It will therefore take some persuading that
this is necessary: cf R (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority [2002] 1 WLR 419 and R
(N) v M [2003] 1 WLR 562. Second, it is not readily accessible to the patient, who is the one person whose
participation in the proceedings must be assured. It sits in London, whereas tribunals sit in the hospital. How
would the patient’s transport to London be arranged? Third, it is not itself an expert tribunal and will therefore
need more argument and evidence than a Mental Health Review Tribunal will need to decide exactly the same
case. All of this takes time, thus increasing the risk that the determination will not be as speedy as Art 5(4)
requires.”
Despite these misgivings, Baroness Hale, who gave the only reasoned speech in H, decided in relation to
a similar issue as was before the Court of Appeal in Rayner that speedy action by the Secretary of State
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and the lower courts combined with, if necessary, a full merits hearing in the Administrative Court, was
sufficient to render section 29(4) MHA compliant with Article 5(4)3.
Similarly, as a matter of judicial theory if not of actual practice, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Rayner,
and hence the compatibility of section 75(1) MHA with the Convention, relies squarely on the
Administrative Court’s availability to act as a kind of ersatz Mental Health Review Tribunal. Keene LJ
added a caveat at the close of his judgment, to the effect that a patient would normally find it quicker
and more effective to apply for an order enforcing the Secretary of State’s statutory duty rather than to
embark on a direct challenge in the courts to the lawfulness of the detention.
But how would a direct challenge in the Administrative Court work, particularly in relation to
conditional discharge? Would the deferred conditional discharge procedure established by the Court of
Appeal in R (IH) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 3 WLR 967 (approved by the House
of Lords [2005] 3 WLR 867) be followed? If not, would there not be a risk of the patient falling into the
Article 5(4) violating limbo which the new regime established in IH was designed to cure? Would the
often drawn out provisional discharge procedure require an Administrative Court judge to order the
Secretary of State to direct discharge if the proposed conditions can be implemented, requiring the
indefinite deferral of a mandatory order? And what if in the meantime the patient has his statutory
hearing before the Mental Health Review Tribunal, the decision of which is at odds with that of the
judge?
It would perhaps be overly cynical to suggest that these are questions which will never be answered
because the Court of Appeal’s judgment in this case relied on a theoretically available direct right of
access to the courts which, while convenient as an Article 5(4) compliant veneer, is never likely to be of
practical use. After all, it is a first principle of the Convention that the protection it affords is practical
and effective.
3 The European Court of Human Rights has recently referred the case of MH v United Kingdom (the appellant in H) to the
Government for its observations both on admissibility and merits. A review of R (H) v Secretary of State for Health [2005] 4
All E.R. 1311 was published in the May 2006 issue of the JMHL @ pp66–75 – see ‘Executive Action and Convention
Compliance? A Risk Unrecognised by the House’ by Kris Gledhill.
